by
Stephen Hicks
For a long
time critics of modern and postmodern art have relied on the
"Isn't that disgusting" strategy. By that I mean the
strategy of pointing out that given works of art are ugly,
trivial, or in bad taste, that "a five-year-old could have
made them," and so on. And they have mostly left it at that.
The points have often been true, but they have also been
tiresome and unconvincing—and the art world has been
entirely unmoved. Of course, the major works of the
twentieth-century art world are ugly. Of course, many
are offensive. Of course, a five-year old could in
many cases have made an indistinguishable product. Those
points are not arguable—and they are entirely beside the
main question. The important question is: Why has the
art world of the twentieth-century adopted the ugly and the
offensive? Why has it poured its creative energies
and cleverness into the trivial and the self-proclaimedly
meaningless?
It is easy to
point out the psychologically disturbed or cynical players
who learn to manipulate the system to get their fifteen
minutes or a nice big check from a foundation, or the
hangers-on who play the game in order to get invited to the
right parties. But every human field of endeavor has
its hangers-on, its disturbed and cynical members, and they
are never the ones who drive the scene. The question is: Why
did cynicism and ugliness come to be the game you had to
play to make it in the world of art?
My first
theme will be that the modern and postmodern art world was
and is nested within a broader cultural framework generated
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Despite occasional invocations of "Art for art's sake" and
attempts to withdraw from life, art has always been
significant, probing the same issues about the human
condition that all forms of cultural life probe. Artists are
thinking and feeling human beings, and they think and feel
intensely about the same important things that all
intelligent and passionate humans do. Even when some artists
claim that their work has no significance or reference or
meaning, those claims are always significant, referential,
and meaningful claims. What counts as a significant cultural
claim, however, depends on what is going on in the broader
intellectual and cultural framework. The world of art is not
hermetically sealed—its themes can have an internal
developmental logic, but those themes are almost never
generated from within the world of art.
My second
theme will be that postmodern art does not represent much of
a break with modernism. Despite the variations that
postmodernism represents, the postmodern art world has never
challenged fundamentally the framework that modernism
adopted at the end of the nineteenth century. There is more
fundamental continuity between them than discontinuity.
Postmodernism has simply become an increasingly narrow set
of variations upon a narrow modernist set of themes. To see
this, let us rehearse the main lines of development.
Modernism's Themes
By now the
main themes of modern art are clear to us. Standard
histories of art tell us that modern art died around 1970,
its themes and strategies exhausted, and that we now have
more than a quarter-century of postmodernism behind us.
The big break
with the past occurred toward the end of the nineteenth
century. Until the end of the nineteenth century, art was a
vehicle of sensuousness, meaning, and passion. Its goals
were beauty and originality. The artist was a skilled master
of his craft. Such masters were able to create original
representations with human significance and universal
appeal. Combining skill and vision, artists were exalted
beings capable of creating objects that in turn had an
awesome power to exalt the senses, the intellects, and the
passions of those who experience them.
The break
with that tradition came when the first modernists of the
late 1800s set themselves systematically to the project of
isolating all the elements of art and eliminating them or
flying in the face of them.
The causes of
the break were many. The increasing naturalism of the
nineteenth century led, for those who had not shaken off
their religious heritage, to feeling desperately alone and
without guidance in a vast, empty universe. The rise of
philosophical theories of skepticism and irrationalism led
many to distrust their cognitive faculties of perception and
reason. The development of scientific theories of evolution
and entropy brought with them pessimistic accounts of human
nature and the destiny of the world. The spread of
liberalism and free markets caused their opponents on the
political Left, many of whom were members of the artistic
avant garde, to see political developments as a series
of deep disappointments. And the technological revolutions
spurred by the combination of science and capitalism led
many to project a future in which mankind would be
dehumanized or destroyed by the very machines that were
supposed to improve its lot.
By the
beginning of the twentieth century, the nineteenth-century
intellectual world's sense of disquiet had become a
full-blown anxiety. The artists responded, exploring in
their works the implications of a world in which reason,
dignity, optimism, and beauty seemed to have disappeared.
The new theme
was: Art must be a quest for truth, however brutal, and
not a quest for beauty. So the question became: What is
the truth of art?
The first
major claim of modernism is a content claim: a demand for a
recognition of the truth that the world is not beautiful.
The world is fractured, decaying, horrifying, depressing,
empty, and ultimately unintelligible.
That claim by
itself is not uniquely modernist, though the number of
artists who signed onto that claim is uniquely modernist.
Some past artists had believed the world to be ugly and
horrible—but they had used the traditional realistic forms
of perspective and color to say this. The innovation of the
early modernists was to assert that form must match
content. Art should not use the traditional
realistic forms of perspective and color because those forms
presuppose an orderly, integrated, and knowable reality.
Edvard
Munch got there first (The
Scream, 1893):
If the truth is that reality is a horrifying, disintegrating
swirl, then both form and content should express the
feeling. Pablo Picasso got there second (Les
Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907):
If the truth is that reality is fractured and empty, then
both form and content must express that. Salvador Dali's
surrealist paintings go a step further: If the truth is that
reality is unintelligible, then art can teach this lesson by
using realistic forms against the idea that we can
distinguish objective reality from irrational, subjective
dreams.
The second
and parallel development within modernism is Reductionism.
If we are uncomfortable with the idea that art or any
discipline can tell us the truth about external, objective
reality, then we will retreat from any sort of content and
focus solely on art's uniqueness. And if we are concerned
with what is unique in art, then each artistic medium is
different. For example, what distinguishes painting from
literature? Literature tells stories—so painting should not
pretend to be literature; instead it should focus on its own
uniqueness. The truth about painting is that it is a
two-dimensional surface with paint on it. So instead of
telling stories, the reductionist movement in painting
asserts, to find the truth of painting painters must
deliberately eliminate whatever can be eliminated from
painting and see what survives. Then we will know the
essence of painting.
Since we are
eliminating, in the following iconic pieces from the
twentieth century world of art, it is often not what is on
the canvas that counts - it is what is not there.
What is significant is what has been eliminated and is now
absent. Art comes to be about absence.
Many
elimination strategies were pursued by the early
reductionists. If, traditionally, painting was cognitively
significant in that it told us something about external
reality, then the first thing we should try to eliminate is
content based on an alleged awareness of reality. Dali's
Metamorphosis
here does double-duty. Dali challenges the idea that what we
call reality is anything more than a bizarre subjective
psychological state. Picasso's Desmoiselles also does
double-duty: If the eyes are the window to the soul, then
these souls are frighteningly vacant. Or if we turn the
focus the other way and say that our eyes are our access to
the world, then Picasso's women are seeing nothing.
So we
eliminate from art a cognitive connection to an external
reality. What else can be eliminated? If traditionally,
skill in painting is a matter of representing a
three-dimensional world on a two-dimensional surface, then
to be true to painting we must eliminate the pretense of a
third dimension. Sculpture is three-dimensional, but
painting is not sculpture. The truth of painting is that it
is not three-dimensional. For example, Barnett
Newman's
Dionysius
(1949)— consisting of a green background with two thin,
horizontal lines, one yellow and one red—is representative
of this line of development. It is paint on canvas and
only paint on canvas.
But
traditional paints have a texture, leading to a
three-dimensional effect if one looks closely. So, as Morris
Louis demonstrates in
Alpha-Phi
(1961), we can get closer to painting's two-dimensional
essence by thinning down the paints so that there is no
texture. We are now as two-dimensional as possible, and that
is the end of this reductionist strategy—the third dimension
is gone.
On the
other hand, if painting is two-dimensional, then perhaps we
can still be true to painting if we paint things that
themselves are two-dimensional. For example, Jasper Johns's
White Flag
(1955-58) is a painted-over American flag, and Roy
Lichtenstein's
Drowning Girl
(1963),
Whaam!
(1963; Figure 4), and
others are over-sized comic-book panels blown up onto large
canvases. But flags and comic books are themselves
two-dimensional objects, so a two-dimensional painting of
them retains their essential truth while letting us remain
true to the theme of painting's two-dimensionality. This
device is particularly clever because, while remaining
two-dimensional, we can at the same time smuggle in some
illicit content—content that earlier had been eliminated.
But of
course that really is cheating, as Lichtenstein went on to
point out humorously with his
Brushstroke
(1965). If painting is the act of making brushstrokes on
canvas, then to be true to the act of painting the product
should look like what it is: a brushstroke on canvas. And
with that little joke, this line of development is over.
So far in our
quest for the truth of painting, we have tried only playing
with the gap between three-dimensional and two-dimensional.
What about composition and color differentiation? Can we
eliminate those?
If,
traditionally, skill in painting requires a mastery of
composition, then, as Jackson Pollock's pieces famously
illustrate, we can eliminate careful composition for
randomness. Or if, traditionally, skill in painting is a
mastery of color range and color differentiation, then we
can eliminate color differentiation. Early in the twentieth
century, Kasimir Malevich's
White on White
(1918) was a whitish square painted on a white background.
Ad Reinhardt's
Abstract Painting
(1960-66) brought
this line of development to a close by showing a very, very
black cross painted on a very, very, very black background.
Or if
traditionally the art object is a special and unique
artifact, then we can eliminate the art object's special
status by making art works that are reproductions of
excruciatingly ordinary objects. Andy Warhol's paintings of
soup cans and reproductions of tomato juice cartons have
just that result. Or in a variation on that theme and
sneaking in some cultural criticism, we can show that what
art and capitalism do is take objects that are in fact
special and unique—such as Marilyn Monroe—and reduce them to
two-dimensional mass-produced commodities (Marilyn
(Three Times), 1962).
Or if
art traditionally is sensuous and perceptually embodied,
then we can eliminate the sensuous and perceptual
altogether, as in conceptual art. Consider Joseph Kosuth's
It was It,
Number 4. Kosuth first created a background of
type-set text that reads:
Observation
of the conditions under which misreadings occur gives rise
to a doubt which I should not like to leave unmentioned,
because it can, I think, become the starting-point for a
fruitful investigation. Everyone knows how frequently the
reader finds that in reading aloud his attention
wanders from the text and turns to his own thoughts. As a
result of this digression on the part of his attention he is
often unable, if interrupted and questioned, to give any
account of what he has read. He has read, as it were,
automatically, but not correctly.
He then
overlaid the black text with the following words in blue
neon:
Description
of the same content twice.
It was it.
Here the
perceptual appeal is minimal, and art becomes a purely
conceptual enterprise— and we have eliminated painting
altogether.
If we put all
of the above reductionist strategies together, the course of
modern painting has been to eliminate the third dimension,
composition, color, perceptual content, and the sense of the
art object as something special.
This
inevitably leads us back to Marcel Duchamp, the grand-daddy
of modernism who saw the end of the road decades earlier.
With his
Fountain
(1917; Figure 6), Duchamp made the quintessential statement
about the history and future of art. Duchamp of course knew
the history of art and, given recent trends, where art was
going. He knew what had been achieved—how over the centuries
art had been a powerful vehicle that called upon the highest
development of the human creative vision and demanded
exacting technical skill; and he knew that art had an
awesome power to exalt the senses, the minds, and the
passions of those who experience it. With his urinal,
Duchamp offered presciently a summary statement. The artist
is not a great creator—Duchamp went shopping at a plumbing
store. The artwork is not a special object—it was
mass-produced in a factory. The experience of art is not
exciting and ennobling—it is puzzling and leaves one with a
sense of distaste. But over and above that, Duchamp did not
select just any ready-made object to display. He could have
selected a sink or a door-knob. In selecting the urinal, his
message was clear: Art is something you piss on.
But there is
a still deeper point that Duchamp's urinal teaches us about
the trajectory of modernism. In modernism, art becomes a
philosophical enterprise rather than an artistic
one. The driving purpose of modernism is not to do
art but to find out what art is. We have eliminated
X —is it still art? Now we have eliminated Y
—is it still art? The point of the objects was not aesthetic
experience; rather the works are symbols representing a
stage in the evolution of a philosophical experiment. In
most cases, the discussions about the works are much
more interesting than the works themselves. That means that
we keep the works in museums and archives and we look at
them not for their own sake, but for the same reason
scientists keep lab notes—as a record of their thinking at
various stages. Or, to use a different analogy, the purpose
of art objects is like that road signs along the highway—not
as objects of contemplation in their own right but as
markers to tell us how far we have traveled down a given
road.
This was
Duchamp's point when he noted, contemptuously, that most
critics had missed the point: "I threw the bottle rack and
the urinal into their faces as a challenge, and now they
admire them for their aesthetic beauty." The urinal is not
art—it is a device used as part of an intellectual exercise
in figuring out why it is not art.
Modernism had
no answer to Duchamp's challenge, and by the 1960s it found
it had reached a dead end. To the extent modern art had
content, its pessimism led it to the conclusion that nothing
was worth saying. To the extent that it played the reductive
elimination game, it found that nothing uniquely artistic
survived elimination. Art became nothing. In the 1960s,
Robert Rauschenberg was often quoted as saying, "Artists are
no better than filing clerks." And Andy Warhol found his
usual smirking way to announce the end when asked what he
thought art was anymore: "Art? —Oh, that's a man's name."
Postmodernism's Four Themes
Where could
art go after death of modernism? Postmodernism did not go,
and has not gone, far. It needed some content and some new
forms, but it did not want to go back to classicism,
romanticism, or traditional realism.
As it had at
the end of the nineteenth century, the art world reached out
and drew upon the broader intellectual and cultural context
of the late 1960s and 1970s. It absorbed the trendiness of
Existentialism's absurd universe, the failure of
Positivism's reductionism, and the collapse of socialism's
New Left. It connected to intellectual heavyweights such as
Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, and it
took its cue from their abstract themes of antirealism,
deconstruction, and their heightened adversarial stance to
Western culture. From those themes, postmodernism introduced
four variations on modernism.
First,
postmodernism re-introduced content—but only
self-referential and ironic content. As with philosophical
postmodernism, artistic postmodernism rejected any form of
realism and became anti-realist. Art cannot be about reality
or nature—because, according to postmodernism, "reality" and
"nature" are merely social constructs. All we have are the
social world and its social constructs, one of those
constructs being the world of art. So, we may have content
in our art as long as we talk self-referentially about the
social world of art.
Secondly,
postmodernism set itself to a more ruthless deconstruction
of traditional categories that the modernists had not fully
eliminated. Modernism had been reductionist, but some
artistic targets remained.
For
example, stylistic integrity had always been an element of
great art, and artistic purity was one motivating force
within modernism. So, one postmodern strategy has been to
mix styles eclectically in order to undercut the idea of
stylistic integrity. An early postmodern example in
architecture, for example, is Philip Johnson's AT&T (now
Sony)
building
in Manhattan—a modern skyscraper that could also be a giant
eighteenth-century Chippendale cabinet. The architectural
firm of Foster & Partners designed the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation
headquarters
(1979-86)—a building that could also be the bridge of a
ship, complete with mock anti-aircraft guns, should the bank
ever need them. Friedensreich Hundertwasser's
House
(1986) in Vienna is more extreme—a deliberate slapping
together of glass skyscraper, stucco, and occasional bricks,
along with oddly placed balconies and arbitrarily sized
windows, and completed with a Russian onion dome or two.
If we
put the above two strategies together, then postmodern art
will come to be both self-referential and destructive. It
will be an internal commentary on the social history of art,
but a subversive one. Here there is a continuity from
modernism. Picasso took one of Matisse's portraits of his
daughter—and used it as a dartboard, encouraging his friends
to do the same. Duchamp's
L.H.O.O.Q.
(1919) is a rendition of
the Mona Lisa with a cartoonish beard and moustache
added.
Rauschenberg
erased a de Kooning work with a heavy wax pencil. In the
1960s, a gang led by George Maciunas performed Philip
Corner's Piano Activities (1962)—which called for a
number of men with implements of destruction such as band
saws and chisels to destroy a grand piano. Niki de Saint
Phalle's Venus de Milo (1962, Figure 8) is a
life-size plaster-on-chickenwire version of the classic
beauty filled with bags of red and black paint; Saint Phalle
then took a rifle and fired upon the Venus, puncturing the
statue and the bags of paint to a splattered effect.
Saint
Phalle's Venus links us to the third postmodern
strategy. Postmodernism allows one to make content
statements as long as they are about social reality
and not about an alleged natural or objective
reality and—here is the variation—as long as they are
narrower race/class/sex statements rather than
pretentious, universalist claims about something called The
Human Condition. Postmodernism rejects a universal human
nature and substitutes the claim that we are all constructed
into competing groups by our racial, economic, ethnic, and
sexual circumstances. Applied to art, this postmodern claim
implies that there are no artists, only hyphenated
artists: black-artists, woman-artists,
homosexual-artists, poor-Hispanic-artists, and so on.
Conceptual
artist Frederic's PMS piece from the 1990s is helpful
here in providing a schema. The piece is textual, a black
canvas with the following words in red:
WHAT
CREATES P.M.S. IN WOMEN?
Power
Money
Sex
Let us
start with Power and consider race. Jane Alexander's
Butcher Boys
(1985-86) is an
appropriately powerful piece about white power. Alexander
places three South African white figures on a bench. Their
skin is ghostly or corpse-like white, and she gives them
monster heads and heart-surgery scars suggesting their
heartlessness. But all three of them are sitting casually on
the bench—they could be waiting for a bus or watching the
passers-by at a mall. Her theme is the banality of evil:
Whites don't even recognize themselves for the monsters they
are.
Now for
Money. There is the long-standing rule in modern art that
one should never say anything kind about capitalism. From
Andy Warhol's criticisms of mass-produced capitalist culture
we can move easily to
Jenny Holzer's
Private Property Created Crime (1982). In the center
of world capitalism—New York's Times Square—Holzer combined
conceptualism with social commentary in an ironically clever
manner by using capitalism's own media to subvert it. German
artist Hans Haacke's Freedom is now simply going to be
sponsored—out of petty cash (1991) is another monumental
example. While the rest of the world was celebrating the end
of brutality behind the Iron Curtain, Haacke erected a huge
Mercedes-Benz logo atop a former East German guard tower.
Men with guns previously occupied that tower—but Haacke
suggests that all we are doing is replacing the rule of the
Soviets with the equally heartless rule of the corporations.
Now for
Sex. Saint Phalle's Venus can do double-duty here. We
can interpret the rifle that shoots into the Venus as a
phallic tool of dominance, in which case Saint-Phalle's
piece can be seen as a feminist protest of male destruction
of femininity. Mainstream feminist art includes Barbara
Kruger's
posters
and room-size exhibits in bold black and red with angry
faces yelling politically correct slogans about female
victimization—art as a poster at a political rally. Jenny
Saville's
Branded
(1992, Figure 10) is a grotesque self-portrait: Against any
conception of female beauty, Saville asserts that she will
be distended and hideous—and shove it in your face.
The fourth
and final postmodern variation on modernism is a more
ruthless nihilism. The above, while focused on the negative,
are still dealing with important themes of power, wealth,
and justice toward women. How can we eliminate more
thoroughly any positivity in art? As relentlessly negative
as modern art has been, what has not been done?
Entrails and blood: An art exhibition in 2000 asked
patrons to place a goldfish in a blender and then turn the
blender on—art as life reduced to indiscriminate liquid
entrails. Marc Quinn's
Self
(1991) is the artist's own blood collected over the course
of several months and molded into a frozen cast of his head.
That is reductionism with a vengeance.
Unusual sex: Alternate sexualities and fetishes have
been pretty much worked over during the twentieth century.
But until recently art has not explored sex involving
children. Eric Fischl's
Sleepwalker
(1979) shows a pubescent boy masturbating while standing
naked in a kiddie pool in the backyard. Fischl's
Bad Boy
(1981) shows a boy stealing from his
mother's purse and looking at his naked mother who is
sleeping with her legs sprawled. If we have read our Freud,
however, perhaps this is not very shocking. So we move on to
Paul McCarthy's
Cultural Gothic
(1992-93) and the theme of
bestiality. In this life-size, moving exhibit, a young boy
stands behind a goat that he is violating. Here we have more
than child sexuality and sex with animals, however: McCarthy
adds some cultural commentary by having the boy's father
present and resting his hands paternally on the boy's
shoulders while the boy thrusts away.
A
preoccupation with urine and feces: Again, postmodernism
continues a longstanding modernist tradition. After
Duchamp's urinal, Kunst ist Scheisse ("Art is shit")
became, fittingly, the motto of the Dada movement. In the
1960s Piero Manzoni canned, labeled, exhibited and sold
ninety tins of his own excrement (in 2002, a British museum
purchased can number 68 for about $40,000). Andres Serrano
generated controversy in the 1980s with his
Piss Christ,
a crucifix submerged in a jar of the artist's urine. In the
1990s Chris Ofili's
The Holy Virgin Mary
(1996) portrayed the
Madonna as surrounded by disembodied genitalia and chunks of
dried feces. In 2000 Yuan Cai and Jian Jun Xi paid homage to
their master, Marcel Duchamp. Fountain is now at the
Tate Museum in London, and during regular museum hours Yuan
and Jian unzipped and proceeded to urinate on Duchamp's
urinal. (The museum's directors were not pleased, but
Duchamp would be proud of his spiritual children.) And there
is G. G. Allin, the self-proclaimed performance artist who
achieved his fifteen minutes by defecating on stage and
flinging his feces into the audience.
So again we
have reached a dead end: From Duchamp's Piss on art
at the beginning of the century to Allin's Shit on you
at the end—that is not a significant development over the
course of a century.
The Future of
Art
The heyday of
postmodernism in art was the 1980s and 90s. Modernism had
become stale by the 1970s, and I suggest that postmodernism
has reached a similar dead-end, a What next? stage.
Postmodern art was a game that played out within a narrow
range of assumptions, and we are weary of the same old, same
old, with only minor variations. The gross-outs have become
mechanical and repetitive, and they no longer gross us out.
So, what
next?
It is helpful
to remember that modernism in art came out of a very
specific intellectual culture of the late nineteenth
century, and that it has remained loyally stuck in those
themes. But those are not the only themes open to artists,
and much has happened since the end of the nineteenth
century.
We would not
know from the world of modern art that average life
expectancy has doubled since Edvard Munch screamed. We would
not know that diseases that routinely killed hundreds of
thousands of newborns each year have been eliminated. Nor
would we know anything about the rising standards of living,
the spread of democratic liberalism, and emerging markets.
We are
brutally aware of the horrible disasters of National
Socialism and international Communism, and art has a role in
keeping us aware of them. But we would never know from the
world of art the equally important fact that those battles
were won and brutality was defeated.
And entering
even more exotic territory, if we knew only the contemporary
art world we would never get a glimmer of the excitement in
evolutionary psychology, Big Bang cosmology, genetic
engineering, the beauty of fractal mathematics—and the
awesome fact that humans are the kind of being that can do
all those exciting things.
Artists and
the art world should be at the edge. The art world is now
marginalized, in-bred, and conservative. It is being left
behind, and for any self-respecting artist there should be
nothing more demeaning than being left behind.
There are few
more important cultural purposes than genuinely advancing
art. We all intensely and personally know what art means to
us. We surround ourselves with it. Art books and videos.
Films at the theatre and on DVD. Stereos at home, music on
our Walkmans, and CD players in our cars. Novels at the
beach and as bedtime reading. Trips to galleries and
museums. Art on the walls of our living space. We are each
creating the artistic world we want to be in. From the art
in our individual lives to the art that is cultural and
national symbols, from the $10 poster to the $10 million
painting acquired by a museum—we all have a major investment
in art.
The world is
ready for the bold new artistic move. That can come only
from those not content with spotting the latest trivial
variation on current themes. It can come only from those
whose idea of boldness is not—waiting to see what can be
done with waste products that has never been done before.
The point is
not that there are no negatives out there in the world for
art to confront, or that art cannot be a means of criticism.
There are negatives and art should never shrink from them.
My argument is with the uniform negativity and
destructiveness of the art world. When has art in the
twentieth century said anything encouraging about
human relations, about mankind's potential for dignity, and
courage, about the sheer positive passion of being in the
world?
Artistic
revolutions are made by a few key individuals. At the heart
of every revolution is an artist who achieves originality. A
novel theme, a fresh subject, or the inventive use of
composition, figure, or color marks the beginning of a new
era. Artists truly are gods: they create a world in their
work, and they contribute to the creation of our cultural
world.
Yet for
revolutionary artists to reach the rest of the world, others
play a crucial role. Collectors, gallery owners, curators,
and critics make decisions about which artists are genuinely
creating—and, accordingly, about which artists are most
deserving of their money, gallery space, and
recommendations. Those individuals also make the
revolutions. In the broader art world, a revolution depends
on those who are capable of recognizing the original
artist's achievement and who have the entrepreneurial
courage to promote that work.
The point is
not to return to the 1800s or to turn art into the making of
pretty postcards. The point is about being a human being who
looks at the world afresh. In each generation there are only
a few who do that at the highest level. That is always the
challenge of art and its highest calling.
The world of
postmodern art is a run-down hall of mirrors reflecting
tiredly some innovations introduced a century ago. It is
time to move on.
Stephen Hicks is a
professor of philosophy at Rockford College in Illinois. He
is the author of Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and
Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault (Scholargy
Publishing, 2004). He can be contacted through his
Web site.
This article is based on lectures given at the Foundation
for the Advancement of Art's "Innovation, Substance, Vision"
conference in New York (October
2003) and the Rockford College Philosophy Club's "The Future
of Art" panel (April 2004).